Huit ans et deux mois après avoir autorisé la réallocation de fonds de Rs 144 701 300, puisés des Identified Savings de Rs 200 millions du budget du ministère de la Santé pour le MedPoint Deal, le Premier ministre et leader du MSM, Pravind Jugnauth, a été blanchi de toute faute sous les dispositions du Prevention of Corruption Act (PoCA). Les Law Lords, siégeant sur le Bench du Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, en l’occurrence Lord Kerr, Lord Carnwath, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Kitchin et Lord Sales, sont parvenus à la conclusion que Pravind Jugnauth ne détient pas de Personal Interest dans le MedPoint Deal et encore moins sa sœur, Shalinee Malhotra. « She had no personal interest », devait soutenir le Privy Council en s’appesantissant sur le fait que « there was already a binding contract and there was a commitment to pay… This is sufficient to dismiss the appeal of the DPP with costs ». Il s’agit d’un des points saillants de ce jugement du Privy Council, se tenant en 42 paragraphes, les Law Lords analysant et commentant chacun des quatre Grounds of Appeal logés par l’Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions contestant l’acquittement en appel par la Cour suprême de la condamnation à douze mois de prison par la Cour intermédiaire de Pravind Jugnauth. Aussitôt la publication du jugement, le Bureau du DPP devait émettre un communiqué officiel commentant les attendus du jugement. De son côté, le MSM a déployé les grands moyens, avec écran géant au Sun Trust, pour le Handing-Down du jugement à 14 heures 30 par le Privy Council à Londres. Depuis le début de l’après-midi, les partisans du MSM se trouvaient sur place alors que le Premier ministre, entouré de ses proches collaborateurs et de ses conseils légaux, allait suivre le dénouement au Prime Minister’s Office avant de se rendre au Sun Trust juste après pour s’adresser à ses partisans.
Au chapitre de la volte-face de l’ICAC, les Law Lords notent que “the Board notes that the Independent Commission against Corruption, which initiated this prosecution, now accepts in its written case on this appeal that it is difficult to see how “an internal reallocation of payments source for the external contract” would be a decision in which Mrs Malhotra would have a personal interest. This is sufficient to dispose of this appeal. The prosecution has failed to establish that the defendant’s sister had a personal interest in the decision, an element of the actus reus of the offence contrary to section 13(2). However, it should also be noted that, by the same token, the defendant could not have had knowledge of the existence of facts giving rise to a personal interest in the decision in his sister, because there were none.”
Pour ce qui est de la position de la Cour suprême pour soutenir l’acquittement, le jugement de la Cour suprême relève que “As the Supreme Court pointed out in its judgment, section 13(2) is intended to relate to such personal interest of an official, his relative or associate in a decision as may give rise to a conflictual situation confronting the public official at the time of his participation in the decision-making process. To restrict the scope of section 13(2) in the manner proposed by the Supreme Court would be totally inconsistent with its own statement of principle. The Board therefore accepts the submission by Mr Perry that the Supreme Court’s reading confuses property rights with interest and represents an artificially narrow approach to the statutory language which would undermine the clear meaning and purpose of the provision. “
Concernant le premier point d’appel, le conseil privé note que « There can be no doubt that the act of signing and approving the minute was a deliberate one. In these circumstances, there is no basis for concluding that the defendant may have been misled by the averment or that the Intermediate Court may have misapplied the law in this regard. If the prosecution is required to prove mens rea, no purpose is served by such a defence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in concluding that the defendant had been deprived of an opportunity to rely on a defence relating to his mental state. In these circumstances, it would not be appropriate for the Board to express any view as to whether a defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact may be available in the law of Mauritius in another context, as the point does not arise in this case and the matter has not been fully argued before us. Different views have been expressed in the authorities as to the nature of the burden on a defendant. This approach has been referred to as “a half-way house”. The Board understands that the question whether such a defence is available in principle in Mauritius has not previously been decided. »
Les Law Lords ont soutenu qu’il n’est pas approprié pour eux de se prononcer sur l’élement de ‘bonne foi’ car il n’y a pas eu d’arguments y relatifs lors des plaidoiries. « As the extracts from the authorities cited by the Supreme Court demonstrate, it is only if the presumption of mens rea is displaced that the question of a possible defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact can arise. If the prosecution is required to prove mens rea, no purpose is served by such a defence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in concluding that the defendant had been deprived of an opportunity to rely on a defence relating to his mental state. In these circumstances, it would not be appropriate for the Board to express any view as to whether a defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact may be available in the law of Mauritius in another context, as the point does not arise in this case and the matter has not been fully argued before us».
Au sujet du quatrième point d’appel, le Privy Council avance que « The board therefore accepts the submission by Mr Perry that the Supreme Court’s reading confuses property rights with interest and represents an artificially narrow approach to the statutory language which would undermine the clear meaning and purpose of the provision. (…) As the Supreme Court pointed out, the evidence was clear that if payment could not be made from the MOHQL surplus, payment would have been made from the original source of payment, the Lottery Fund. The reallocation decision was solely concerned with whether the money paid should be booked to MOFED’s 2010 Lottery Fund budget or MOHQL’s 2010 budget. »
Sur la question d’intérêt personnel, le jugement notre « There is no good reason to give the word “personal” a more limiting effect. Interest is not required to be a financial one. The board is of the view that Mrs Malhotra cannot have had a personal interest. The decision cannot have affected the interest of Mrs Malhotra. The only question was from which pocket the fund should come. There was already a binding contract and a legal commitment to pay the money. The funds to make the payment were available. This is sufficient to dipose of the appeal. The prosecution has failed to establish that the defendant’s sister had a personal interest in the decision, an element of the actus reus of the offence contrary to section 13(2). However, it should also be noted that, by the same token, the defendant could not have had knowledge of the existence of facts giving rise to a personal interest in the decision in his sister, because there were none. »
Réaction du DPP
Quelques minutes après le “handing down” du jugement dans l’affaire MedPoint, le bureau du Directeur des poursuites publiques, dans un communiqué, dit prendre note que les Law Lords du Privy Council ont accepté leur position sur les points de droits avancés en appel. « However, it has also found that on the facts of the present case, payment to MedPoint would have been effected irrespective of the re-allocation of funds and, therefore, Mrs Malhotra had no personal interest within the meaning of section 13(2) of the POCA », est-il écrit dans le communiqué. Le bureau du DPP souligne que ce jugement servira dans la détermination des autres procès sous la section 13(2) de la POCA. « The judgment of the Privy Council will undoubtedly be of valuable assistance to our Office when deciding future cases under section 13(2) of the POCA. Our Office was of the view that the judgment of the Supreme Court gave rise to important questions, crucial to establishing an offence under section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. »